Differences in Doctrine

After reading through their paper, a rather intense discussion began on the merits of their thoughts. If the accounts were accurate, and they appeared to be so, then it could indicate that trenches were indeed more effective than thought. That said, it was quickly pointed out that the artillery used was of an older variant and that in all the cases, there seemed to be a technological gap between the Ryukyuans and their adversaries.

Finally, an argument erupted on the Battle of the Baurgs which was between the majority camp that felt that trenches were not effective against artillery and that only properly fortified walls could protect from shell and those that thought that the foreigners might be on to something. Ultimately, it devolved into a stalemate and the two sides decided that the only way forward would be to test artillery on some examples of the two fortification styles.

In response to the report, another was drawn up to explain the Raikh's strategies and tactics.

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Our military is built around the intensification and long term fortification of our border forces with the goal of establishing a total area of control in which any attack can be quickly absorbed and then destroyed through envelopment and overwhelming weight of force when we are allowed time to prepare our defences and skirmishing when we are not allowed to prepare our defences, trying to wear down the enemy with feint attacks and attrition warfare, whilst avoiding giving fight until we have an overwhelming force built up to make a push.

For the first type of warfare, we must simply look to the last war, and specifically to the Battle of the Baurgs. Despite being forced to land with unfavourable numbers of men, the Raikh was able to fortify its position in New Respite and establish a Baurgs in a preferable position. If the forces of the lying and untrustworthy monotheists had shown vigour in their warmaking and attacked earlier in numbers, the men of the Raikh would have surely be slain to a man. It was because of their oversight in allowing us to fortify that our forces were capable of withstanding a later attack.

Despite your position on the matter, we found that well prepared earthen walls with wood and brick tunnels and bunkers built into them are superior for resisting artillery fire. While we also built trenches, they were used as a means of stopping infantry from rushing to the walls and scaling our fortress, which was built in the most modern and sensible fashion of star fort consisting of four straight walls around the centre, with the corners having arrowhead like winged bastions to protrude out, and then further arrowhead bastions being placed before the centre of the walls and then again in an offset position which if drawn from a radiation centre of degrees from the heart of the fortress, would have its centre-line directly betwix those of the nearest corner bastion and before-wall bastion. Naturally, all the walls were built in the modern fashion so as to resist artillery shot and mortars, with them resting at a minimum angle of sixty degrees and a maximum angle of fifty, leaning inwards towards the centre.

With guns placed in prepared and fortified positions, the fortress was able to cover all of its walls and the men that numbered ten-thousand eight-hundred and ninety in total were able to repulse an attack from a much larger force of some fifty-five thousand three-hundred and nineteen men under arms. Both forces suffered a casualty rate of approximately eighty-nine percent, but through counter artillery fire provided in part by the Hauhkunoleiksflutt and our prepared defences, the Raikh was able to retain control of its position and claimed a strategic victory that day, despite the large differential in numbers.

With regards to the latter form of defence, we must return further in time to our last civil war. While this is far less recent, we do feel that it demonstrates aptly how the tactics work within this strategy and why it is still viable in this modern era of warfare.

During the civil war, despite at times being outnumbered ten to one by rebel forces, the Raikhsharjis was able to conduct defence-in-depth and avoid taking part in unfavourable battles. By carrying out skirmishing actions, we were able to force the rebels to maintain high concentrations of forces and hampered their efforts to spread out and secure regions, whilst also reducing their numbers at a rate of seven deaths to one favouring us at times. We were also able to carry out ambushes and raids on their patrols and supply trains respectively, causing much attrition to the rebels. Furthermore, our harassment kept the enemy forces second guessing our intentions until they no longer had the sense to truly respond to our movements.

By the time we had prepared ourselves and gained enough in numbers to carry out an attack on their forces, they were unable or unwilling to respond in many cases. They felt that they could not trust their instincts and reports on whether we were truly massing to attack thanks to previous feints and their men were exhausted from our campaigns of savagery and harassment. This allowed us to successfully break their lines when we finally counter attacked and ultimately arrested their forward momentum into our lands.

For offensive strategies, we follow a strong policy to avoid over-extension and to carry out appeasement until we are ready to strike. We also have a good focus on interior lines, keeping supply lines as short as possible and lines close, as well as preferring turning movements, as they force the enemy to either weaken the line to a major frontal assault or handicap their response to forces wrecking havoc in their rear. Occupational strategies vary from 'der Krieg ernährt den Krieg' to clear and hold.

During our civil war, the campaigns in Tanysira, and the last war, we carried out many successful campaigns according to these principles. In Tanysira, our forces held their positions and built up, before then expanding outwards into the interior. As we did so, we built fortresses and outposts, so as to keep our supply lines short and secure lands through regular patrols and centres of power. Sadly, during those campaigns, the enemy never truly mustered to face us, so we can not discuss our preferred means of destroying an organised foe there.

During the last war, our men were deft as ever in their application of force. Again, we held our positions in foreign lands and avoided fighting until we had the numbers, and again we built up strong interior lines through the establishment of fortifications from which we could project control over the surrounding lands. After the near total destruction of the local army, we chose to pursue a policy of appeasement with the locals. We would wheel our forces around and then offer to this or that city that we would leave them alone, if only they would leave us alone and swear to remain neutral. This policy served us well, as we quickly made through their lands and stole ourselves away towards their capital. 

The enemy was so confounded and cowardly, that once we had brought a meagre few thousand to bear down on their chief city, they sued for peace, not realising that their undoing had come from their own side's willingness to accept our offers of truce and amnesty. It was through our close interior lines that we were able to always supply our forces quickly and efficiently, as well as reinforce them and redeploy them with ease, as the many outposts and fortifications along roads acted as great buffers and staging areas for operations in areas we had taken and protected our rear lines from enemy raids as well. Ideally, we would have had more railways, as better transportation networks are a great way to keep lines close together, but that is not always viable and such construction should be saved for long running conflicts.

For a great example of a turning motion though, we must cast our minds back to the War in Duom. During one of those hellish months when the rains fell upon the land, we managed to pierce through the enemy lines. Bringing our forces forward through the breach, we naturally ordered the whole front to engage the enemy as our men made to go through their rear. This resulted in utter chaos amongst the local barbarians and we were able to quickly fold their lines and break them into several pockets, which were quickly dealt with. From there, we then carried out a truly masterful capture of their capital, one which was in the middle of a large lake, and were able to end the war quickly.

Now, as for our operational policies, we feel that they need no explanation beyond the following. One places the need to supply the army on the army and is useful for bringing about starvation in an enemy's population and reducing them to squalor, as the army strips them of their food, medicine, and goods, whilst the other is good for maintaining a population in its prosperity for later usage. Concentration camps are a new method we have recently developed that can be useful in the execution of either strategy, with them allowing for greater ease of control over occupied populations. 

If you round up civilians and place them in camps, you can control the flow of food, medicine, and water to them quite easily and reduce their numbers efficiently through the application of gasses or automatic fire. They are also excellent for breaking populations so your forces can then ship them else where to act as slave labour. If your purpose is not to feed your war effort off of the lands you take, then we must advise that you only use them in the most gentle of fashions, interning populations of regions which have had partisan activity there only, with plentiful food, space, medicine, and water for them. Once the threat has been dealt with, you can then begin staged releases of the populations interned and keep track of who is in each stage, allowing you to reduce the number of suspects should partisan activity resume after a release.

Both have their advantages and drawbacks and really it is the situation that dictates which is employed, but we feel that these two are the only true options with which a leader is presented. To loot and ravage a land or to carefully occupy and clear it of partisans. Anything else, any compromise, risks total disaster, as it can anger the locals and bring them to rebellion without sufficiently depriving them of those materials required to live and fight, or else allow partisans to remain behind your front lines and provide material support to your enemies and hamper your forces, through means of attack, harassment, or spying.

We hope that these examples will prove useful to your forces and enlightening to your officers.